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COMMENT ON THE HARRIS PAPER
Kenneth M. Lehn t
Professor Harris has written an insightful paper on the October
1987 stock market crash that deserves a wide reading among econo-
mists, legal scholars, and policymakers. His discussion of the three
types of stock price volatility-fundamental, transaction-induced
and noise-induced-provides a rich understanding of the economics
of market-making, and it establishes a useful analytical framework
for assessing the efficacy of policy proposals related to the market
crash. My comments are confined to two general areas: Professor
Harris's discussion of the causes of the crash, and his analysis of
policy proposals related to the crash.
I
CAUSES OF THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH
Professor Harris suggests that the October 1987 stock market
crash was triggered by bad macroeconomic news and exacerbated
by the "misuse" of portfolio insurance. Although he suggests sev-
eral possible triggers, including bad news about interest rates, the
trade deficit, and the value of the dollar, Professor Harris neglects
the effect that passage of takeover tax legislation by the House Ways
and Means Committee had on stock prices during the week of Octo-
ber 12, 1987. Professors Mitchell and Netter provide evidence that
strongly supports the Brady Report's conclusion that this legislation
was one of the principal triggers of the crash.1
As Professor Harris argues, the stock market crash represented
a fundamental revaluation of stocks, rather than a transitory revalua-
tion resulting from a huge, but temporary, imbalance of sell orders
on October 19. In support of this argument, he refers to the fact
that, although stock prices increased substantially on October 20,
they recovered only a fraction of the value that had been lost on the
prior day. This argument is even stronger than Professor Harris
suggests, since it is likely that at least part of the 102 point increase
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) on October 20 derived
t Chief Economist, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1 M. MITCHELL &J. NETrTER, TRIGGERING THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH? AN-
TITAKEOVER PROVISIONS IN THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS TAX BILL (forthcoming).
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from significant fundamental news, rather than an alleviation of the
prior day's order imbalances.
In particular, two news announcements on October 20 proba-
bly had a significant positive effect on stock prices. First, immedi-
ately prior to the opening of U.S. equity markets on October 20, the
Federal Reserve Board announced that it "affirms its readiness to
serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial
system." It is reasonable to believe that at least part of the 197
point increase in the DJIA during the first hour of trading on Octo-
ber 20 can be attributed to this announcement. Second, several
hundred companies, including 91 S&P 500 companies, announced
stock buyback programs on October 20. According to both the
Brady Report and the SEC Staff Report, these buyback announce-
ments had a positive effect on stock prices.
Professor Harris cites the misuse of portfolio insurance as an
important contributing factor to the crash. He suggests that, prior
to the crash, users of portfolio insurance overestimated the protec-
tion that this strategy provided, and thereby underestimated the
riskiness of equity investments. Professor Harris raises the possibil-
ity that the growing popularity of portfolio insurance before the
crash might explain why stock prices were rising beyond their appar-
ent fundamental values during early 1987. If, during the crash pe-
riod, it became apparent that portfolio insurance was unable to
deliver the protection that users of this strategy had expected, then
one of the important events of this period might have been an up-
ward revision of the risk premium associated with equity
investments.
This theory of the crash is appealing in several ways. First, in
addition to explaining a large part of the price decline during Octo-
ber 1987, it suggests a reason for the otherwise anomalous large
increase in equity values during the year preceding the crash. Sec-
ond, it provides an explanation of the crash that is consistent with
the fact that during October 1987 there was no apparent
macroeconomic news that alone can explain an approximately
twenty-five percent decline in stock prices. Similarly, unlike most
other explanations of the crash, it can explain why stock prices took
so long to return to pre-crash levels, despite the absence of subse-
quent bad macroecomonic news.
Although this theory is logically consistent, its empirical rele-
vance is undermined by the fact that the estimated value of portfo-
lios that used portfolio insurance strategies before the crash was
only $60-90 billion. Since the total value of equities traded in U.S.
markets approximated four trillion dollars shortly before the crash,
it is doubtful that a devaluation of equity risk premiums by insured
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portfolios alone could have accounted for such a substantial in-
crease in stock prices during the year prior to the crash. However, it
does seem reasonable that the revealed loss of liquidity in equity
markets during the crash period raised the risk premium associated
with equity investments, and thereby exacerbated the price decline.
To the extent that portfolio insurance selling contributed idiosyn-
cratically to this loss of liquidity, vis-a-vis other types of selling, then
Professor Harris's theory is compelling. Furbush, however, has
found that stock price movements during five minute intervals on
October 19 were not significantly correlated with any type of pro-
gram trading in the stock market on this day, including portfolio
insurance selling. 2 Hence, Furbush's evidence suggests that portfo-
lio insurance selling did not contribute disproportionately to a loss
of liquidity on October 19.
II
ANALYSIS OF POLICY PROPOSALS
As the title of his paper indicates, Professor Harris objects to
most of the post-crash policy proposals that have been suggested as
remedies to perceived structural "problems" in our financial mar-
kets. To the extent that portfolio insurance was a culprit in the
crash, he argues, there has been considerable self-correction, since
the portfolio insurance market is less than one-third its pre-crash
size. Professor Harris also argues that, to the extent that the crash
precipitates policy changes, these changes should be directed at en-
hancing the supply of liquidity, rather than reducing the demand for
liquidity. Although I agree almost completely with Professor Harris'
policy recommendations, I am more sanguine about the efficacy of
circuit breakers (i.e., coordinated trading halts), provided that the
triggers are set at a level that is sufficiently high to make these trad-
ing halts occur only when prices move by an extraordinary amount
in a short period.
Professor Harris provides an insightful analysis of the possible
effects of trading halts and price limits on stock price volatility, but
he neglects what is potentially the most important benefit of circuit
breakers, namely, the coordination of trading halts across markets. In
some sense, the issue of whether or not trading halts are appropri-
ate on days such as October 19-20 is academic; in practice, we ex-
perienced trading halts in individual stocks on both days, and in the
futures markets on October 20. However, since these ad hoc trad-
ing halts were not coordinated across markets, the cost of index ar-
2 Furbush, Program Trading and Price Movement: Evidence From the 1987 Market Crash,
18 FIN. MGMT. 68 (1989).
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bitrage became prohibitively high, contributing to a persistent
disparity between futures and cash prices, and a diminution in over-
all liquidity.
In this respect, uncoordinated trading halts have effects that are
similar to access restrictions to computerized order submission sys-
tems, which Professor Harris properly criticizes as raising the cost of
index arbitrage, reducing liquidity, and raising transaction-induced
volatility. Although some important practical problems concerning
their design exist-including the choice of appropriate triggers and
procedures for reopening markets-coordinated trading halts may
facilitate the linkage of markets during periods of extraordinary
stress, and thereby have a favorable effect on transaction-induced
volatility.
If coordinated trading halts have salutary effects, one might ask,
wouldn't the exchanges have sufficiently strong incentives to imple-
ment them without prodding from federal regulators? Although
there is obvious merit to this view, I am skeptical about the ade-
quacy of these incentives when they involve intermarket issues, such
as coordinated trading halts. To illustrate the occasional incompati-
bility of private exchange incentives with economic efficiency, con-
sider the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE's) post-crash policy
concerning the use of its Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) Sys-
tem, the computerized order entry system that is used for submit-
ting index arbitrage trades. On October 20, 1987, the NYSE
suspended the use of the DOT system; by raising the cost of index
arbitrage, this policy undoubtedly contributed to the erratic price
movements on October 20.3 Notwithstanding the salutary effect
that index arbitrage might have had on October 20, the NYSE's de-
sire to impede index arbitrage on October 20 is understandable,
since index arbitrage was adding to the demand for liquidity in the
stock market-through enhancing the supply of liquidity in the fu-
tures market.
After the NYSE resumed the use of DOT in November 1987, it
adopted a pilot plan that suspended the use of DOT on days when
the DJIA moved at least 50 points. Further evidence of the mischief
caused by suspending the DOT system can be found in the stock
price movements of April 14, 1988. After the DJIA declined by 50
points on this day, the DOT system was suspended. Almost instan-
taneously, the S&P 500 futures price went from fair value to a deep
discount, and remained there for the duration of the day. Hence,
the suspension of DOT contributed to price uncertainty, and proba-
3 On October 20, 1987, from 9:30 A.M. to 10:27 A.M. the DJIA increased 197
points, from 10:27 A.M. to 12:20 P.M. the DJIA decreased 225 points, and from 12:29
P.M. to 1:09 P.M. the DJIA increased 124 points.
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bly inhibited some potential buyers from the equity markets on this
day. Although the NYSE has since terminated the pilot plan, this
example suggests that the private incentives of exchanges to foster
arbitrage across the futures and stock markets may be insufficient.4
I agree with Professor Harris's discussion of three other policy
proposals related to the crash. A stock transfer tax would be ineffi-
cient. However, as a practical matter, it is unlikely to gain much
political support, since its main effect would be to encourage institu-
tional investors to trade in foreign markets. As Professor Harris in-
dicates, higher margins could actually increase, rather than
decrease, stock price volatility; furthermore, higher margins on
stocks and futures are unnecessary to protect broker-dealers, since
they presumably have sufficient incentives to set "prudential" mar-
gins at the proper level. 5 Further restrictions on mergers and acqui-
sitions would impair the market for corporate control, and inhibit
the efficient redeployment of assets that often follows these transac-
tions. Furthermore, a large part of the recovery in stock prices since
October 1987 undoubtedly derives from the booming takeover mar-
ket in 1988 that resulted in significant takeover premiums and, pre-
sumably, an increase in the expected control premium of many
companies that were not taken over in 1988. Ironically, attempts to
curb stock price volatility by restricting mergers and acquisitions
could very well have the adverse effect that the takeover take legisla-
tion apparently had in October 1987.
4 The NYSE's pilot plan regarding the use of the DOT system has an historical
analogue. In a chapter entitled "Use of the Telegraph" in his 1894 book on the New
York Stock Exchange, Francis L. Eames wrote:
the arbitrage business conducted by members of the New York Stock Ex-
change between New York and other American cities was formerly very
large. But competition between the arbitrageurs became so extreme that
some members, dealing through partners on Exchanges in other cities,
often conducted their operations on these Exchanges in a way which was
considered to be detrimental to the interests of the New York Stock Ex-
change. It was believed to be practically impossible to control a mem-
ber's operations on another Exchange. Consequently, in May 1984,
some of the facilities for sending instantaneous and continuous private
quotations to other cities were withdrawn. Since that date the domestic
arbitrage operations have been on a very reduced scale.
See F. EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (1984).
5 For an empirical examination of the adequacy of existing margin policy for pru-
dential purposes, see INTERIM REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
Appendix B (1984).
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